Musharraf's Last Act?
General Musharraf appeared on the national scene on October 12, 1999, when he ousted an elected government and announced an ambitious "nation-building" project.
Many Pakistanis, disillusioned with Pakistan's political class, remained mute, thinking that he might deliver.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America brought Musharraf into the international limelight as he agreed to ditch the Taliban and support the United States-led war on terror.
Musharraf clamped down on some religious militants operating inside Pakistan and also on those fighting Indian forces in Kashmir.
As a result, Pakistan was rewarded with American financial assistance and arms.
In furtherance of his re-alignment, Musharraf sent the Pakistani army into the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan for the first time since Pakistan's independence.
Operations there against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces brought mixed results.
Although the US viewed Musharraf as an agent of change, he has never achieved domestic political legitimacy, and his policies were seen as rife with contradictions.
For example, he made alliances with Islamist political forces (who in 2004 voted for constitutional changes legitimizing his position and actions).
At the same time, he sidelined moderate, mainstream political leaders while claiming that he stood for "enlightened moderation."
A series of ill-planned military operations in the tribal areas further complicated the situation in the volatile border region.
Last March, Musharraf took his boldest step, removing the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Chaudhry.
To the surprise of many, the country's legal community organized a nation-wide movement to restore the Chief Justice to his post.
Hundreds of thousands of ordinary people demanded the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution, emboldening the judiciary and changing the country's political dynamic.
In a historic ruling that Musharraf had little choice but to accept, the Supreme Court itself reinstated the Chief Justice in July.
Subsequently, the energized judiciary continued ruling against government decisions, embarrassing the government -- especially its intelligence agencies.
Government officials were held accountable for actions that were usually beyond the reach of the law, ranging from brutal beatings of journalists, to illegal confinement for "national security."
Musharraf and his political allies tried to adjust to this new reality, but their patience ran out when the Supreme Court took up petitions against Musharraf's decision to run for president.
According to the constitution (originally promulgated in 1973 by an elected parliament), a serving military official cannot run for an elected office.
Musharraf was not ready to give up his military post, but also wanted to be a civilian president.
While he announced that he would leave his military position "if" he was elected president, his track record of reneging on his promises haunted the judiciary.
The proceedings of the court over the last few weeks made Musharraf jittery.
The decision of the 11-member bench might easily have gone against him.
Legally cornered, Musharraf has now decided to abandon constitutionality, removing the leading judges of the Supreme Court and provincial high courts and putting curbs on the media.
Lawyers, human rights activists, and political leaders have since been arrested.
There is widespread public resentment in response to these moves.
Rather than taking responsibility for the deteriorating security situation (as evidenced by regular suicide bomb attacks) and the increasing Talibanization of the tribal areas, Musharraf has tried to blame the judiciary and media.
To be sure, in some cases, judicial activism was obvious (though within the realm of constitutional law), and the media also made mistakes; but by no stretch of the imagination can these be linked to religious extremism or support for militancy.
It is unlikely that Musharraf's latest gambit will succeed, as his popular support is at its lowest ebb.
Pakistan's armed forces -- repeated targets of suicide bombers -- have become demoralized.
It is difficult to imagine them standing with Musharraf should civil conflict erupt.
Nor can a weak, embattled, and disoriented Musharraf be expected to fight Islamic militancy effectively or bring political stability to Pakistan.
Opposition political parties are drawing closer together, and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, despite progress in her power-sharing negotiations with Musharraf, has strongly condemned his actions.
Human rights bodies, media associations, and lawyers' organizations are expected to defy the emergency, which will pit them against the security forces.
Terrorists may also benefit by attacking a preoccupied army and political forces aligned with Musharraf.
In the event of sustained protests and potential violence, top military commanders may decide to send Musharraf home -- a decision that would not be unprecedented in Pakistan's chronically turbulent history.
The Making of a Murder in Pakistan
Instead, Bhutto had to pay with her life for courageously challenging extremists of all stripes -- from Al-Qaeda and Taliban to the country's religious political parties and military hardliners.
As heir to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the legendary democratic leader who was hanged by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's government in 1979, Benazir emerged as a symbol of resistance at a young age -- but languished in jails and exile in the 1980's.
Z. A. Bhutto's legacy was empowerment of the impoverished and defense of ordinary people's rights amid feudalistic politics and military rule.
Rather than bowing to the military junta, he embraced the gallows.
Hours before his hanging, Benazir was allowed to see her father for the last time, writing in her autobiography: "I told him on my oath in his death cell, I would carry on his work."
She largely lived up to the promise.
Her first stint as prime minister (1988-90) was brief and disorganized.
Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, confirmed that he sponsored an alliance of right-wing political parties to stop her from getting a parliamentary majority.
Information about Pakistan's nuclear program and ISI operations in Afghanistan were out of her domain.
Her second term in office (1993-96) was longer and better, but her government again fell early, owing to charges of mismanagement and corruption.
In reality, machinations by the intelligence agencies also played a part.
The military had developed an entrenched distrust of her, given her position as a popularly supported pro-Western leader who wanted peace with India.
After almost a decade in self-imposed exile, Bhutoo's return to Pakistan in October gave her a fresh political start.
Pakistan had changed, as military dictatorship and religious extremism in the north played havoc with the fabric of society.
A tentative arrangement with Musharraf, together with Western support -- particularly from the United Kingdom and the United States -- eased her return, which hundreds of thousands of people welcomed, though terrorists greeted her with a string of suicide bombings.
Bhutto's contacts with Mushararf's military government drew criticism, but she remained adamant that a return to democracy was possible only through a transition in which Musharraf would give up his military post, become a civilian head of state, and conduct free and fair elections.
To the dismay of some democratic forces, Bhutto stayed the course even after Musharraf imposed emergency rule on November 3 and removed the country's top judges to ensure his re-election.
Indeed, she even persuaded other important political leaders to participate in the planned January 8 election, which she viewed as an opportunity to challenge religious extremist forces in the public square.
She seized that opportunity by bravely traveling throughout the country, despite serious threats to her life, arguing for a democratic and pluralistic Pakistan.
One can understand why religious extremists like Al-Qaeda and Taliban would target her, and the government claims that it is impossible to defend against a suicide attack.
But Bhutto was reportedly killed by a sharp shooter before the terrorist blew himself up.
So, in the eyes of Pakistan's people, and especially of Bhutto's supporters, the intelligence services, either alone or in collaboration with extremists, finally decided to eliminate her.
Whether or not the government was involved, the fact remains that Pakistan has lost a desperately needed leader.
With Pakistan's future in the balance, the West's help and support will be crucial, but that means recognizing that Musharraf is not the only leader who can resolve Pakistan's myriad problems and manage the war on terror.
On the contrary, by nurturing the current environment of instability and uncertainty, Musharraf himself must be regarded as one of Pakistan's biggest problems.
Exorcising Musharraf's Ghost
Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, democracy is not new to this 60-year-old state, but ethnic cleavages, weak institutions, and religious extremism in the North are perennially destabilizing.
And, while the new government settles in and establishes its priorities, the West, especially the United States, must reassess the impact of its past dealings with Pakistan.
Pakistan's new prime minister, Yousaf Gilani, is a seasoned politician and, more importantly, has Sufi family roots, which is a good omen because of the Sufi tradition of tolerance.
Gilani unequivocally declared in his inaugural address that fighting terrorism is a top priority, and his first decision was to release from house arrest judges deposed by Musharraf.
The respite from the horrendous spate of suicide bombings since the new government assumed power is similarly heartening.
But the honeymoon period is coming to an end.
Already, in Gilani's hometown of Multan, rioters attacked government offices and banks to protest electricity disruptions.
A couple of well-known opposition politicians, a chief minister and a federal cabinet minister of the previous pro-Musharraf government, were publicly thrashed, raising doubts about government control over law and order in the country.
So far, Musharraf has accepted his diminishing stature quietly -- though he has few other options.
The new political leadership, both inside and outside the parliament, has been carefully avoiding a head-on collision with the president.
Interestingly, in the midst of the political transition, Musharraf embarked on a week-long visit to China to lobby for construction of an oil and gas pipeline between China and the Persian Gulf that would be routed through Pakistan.
The deeper question raised by this proposal is whether Musharraf meant to convey a message to the US that Pakistan's priorities were shifting.
The revival of democratic politics in Pakistan will undoubtedly effect Pakistan-US relations.
Pakistan's military links with America appear to remain on a sound footing, so the strategic alliance with the US is likely to continue, perhaps with some nuanced differences over how to fight the "war on terror."
But Pakistani politicians are bound to be influenced by domestic public opinion, which is generally critical of US policies.
Nevertheless, long-term US interests in the region will be better served if Pakistan's democratic forces successfully establish themselves.
A proposal in the US Senate to increase development and education aid to Pakistan could help in winning the hearts and minds.
Meanwhile, President George W. Bush has said that "if another September 11-style attack is being planned, it probably is being plotted in Pakistan and not Afghanistan."
Whether this American intelligence assessment is based on credible information is unknown.
American election-year politics may also be behind this assertion.
But it is significant that Bush decided to voice this view during Pakistan's political transition.
Pakistan must take this view seriously, regardless of Bush's motivations.
The new government should quickly devise a policy to deal with terrorism.
Recent months have seen dozens of suicide bombings and other terrorist activities -- the price of Pakistan's own past blunders, as well as those of the West.
Afghanistan is a prime example, as is the failure to settle the Kashmir imbroglio with India.
Both failures have strengthened domestic terrorist groups.
Pakistan's government appears to be preparing to talk to some of the extremists in the tribal areas, introduce political reforms, and redouble development efforts.
But reference to "talks" makes the West uncomfortable.
American officials have likened this strategy to negotiating with terrorists, and point to a previous round of negotiations that did nothing to stop violence in the tribal areas.
But the new leadership wants to distinguish between al-Qaeda terrorists and religious conservatives and disillusioned Pashtun youth within Pakistan.
After all, the victory of the secular Awami National Party (ANP) in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province is a strong indication that people there have rejected religious political forces and violence.
This window of opportunity can be expanded through dialogue and reconciliation with those who are ready to disavow extremism and militancy.
The new Pakistani government needs to explain this to the West in order to keep its support.
The US, meanwhile, should end direct military strikes in the area, even if these are conducted with the knowledge and cooperation of Pakistan's military.
Force has never worked with the Pashtun tribes, and there is no evidence that this has changed.
There are real signs that the new government is considered a credible partner in the tribal areas.
